The Materialism

Erich Frauwallner

(December 28, 1898 – January 5, 1974)

It is advantageous to join the
nature-philosophical schools with the description of Materialism, as the latter
stands nearer to them than all other schools. By the way the Indians themselves,
as a rule, speak not of Materialism but they characterize its adherents usually
as deniers or negativists (nastikah).
And it has its good ground. For the Indian Materialism the essential thing is
not the denial of the soul and the exclusive restriction to matter as the cause
for the explanation of the world. The decisive thing, on the contrary, is its
purely negative interest. Its aim is to dispute and deny the continuance of
life after death, the retribution of good and bad work and the moral claims
derived out of them. It is interested in philosophical questions only so far as
they serve this aim. Concerning the rest, it is indifferent to them. That
distinguishes it from all others and also from Nature-philosophical schools.
Naturally Materialism could reach its aim most quickly, if it denied the
existence of the soul. But so far as the assumption of a soul served only the
explanation of the phenomenal world, as was the case in the old
Nature-philosophy, before it was connected up with belief in God and with the
doctrine of Deliverance, it was also acceptable to the Materialism. As a
matter’ of fact, there are also found given materialistic directions which
recognize a soul in this sense and which have established a connection,
therethrough, with the Nature-philosophical schools. But while these
nature-philosophical schools were governed by the striving towards the
understanding of the phenomenal world and their attempts at explanation
gradually formed into the full-fledged philosophical system, the materialists
satisfied themselves all the while with their positing of a purely negative
aim. Therefore the Indian characterization of them as ‘deniers or negativists’
is appropriate. But in my presentation I will follow the usual practice for the
sake of simplicity and speak of Materialism by which a man should not lose sight
of the right understanding of what has been said.

Erich Frauwallner

Materialistic directions of the
above-mentioned kind are already found in India since early times. The old
maxim, that materialism is as old as philosophy, holds good also here. And just
as we hear, in the recorded oldest Vedic monuments, of believers in god, also
of god-deniers, there is also information about materialistic directions
standing side by side with the oldest recorded monuments of philosophical
doctrine. In India,
there early emerges a characteristic feature which also holds good for the
later period-a close connection of materialism with political theory. The
Indians had early developed a systematic doctrine of state-craft which made
light of all moral scruples in the positing of its aim and of the choice of
means, which, therefore, corresponds to what for us is associated with the name
of Machiavelli. The embodiment of this statecraft is the legendary Minister of
the King Candragupta of the Maurya family, who founded for the first time an
indigenous empire on the Indian soil at the end of the fourth century B.C. The
Indian tradition ascribes the merit for the success of Candragupta to this
Brahmana named Canakya or Kautilya and has always seen in him an unsurpassed
master of the art of statecraft. The most famous Indian literary work about the
science of statecraft is handed down under his name. This Canakya, as is shown
by tradition, is the prototype of the unscrupulous Real-politiker who avoids no
means, if it only leads him to his goal. And his ideal as well as his theory
has been much esteemed in the circles of practical Politikers or politicians.

It is now easy to understand that
such a Politiker from the point of world-view supported himself on a doctrine
which put out of the way or removed all moral scruples that were hindrances to
his action. One such doctrine was Materialism. Its positing of the aim, as we
have described above, corresponds entirely with its purpose. It was created for
this circle, whether it may acknowledge it openly or secretly. It is,
therefore, certainly no accident that the first materialist, whom tradition has
handed down to us in living vivid colours, is a King.

King Paesi: We find, in the canon of the Jaina, as also of the
Buddhists, the account of a conversation which one of their teachers had with a
King who adhered to a gross materialism. The conversation ends, as it is to be
expected according to the origin of the report, with the conversion of the
King. But the narration is carried out in such a lively way and gives such a
graphic picture of the materialistic views in the period of the Jaina and the
Buddha that I cite a few pieces out of them.1

In the City of Seyaviya, there rules a bad King Paesi (the
Buddhists call him Payasi) who believes in no God and no beyond. One day, the
holy man Kesi arrives in this city. Now the King has a charioteer named Citta
who was won over earlier by Kesi as an adherent and who longingly wishes that
the King also should be converted. He knows how to arrange it skillfully so
that the King, during his morning drive, alights down in the park in which Kesi
is staying and it comes to a conversation between the King and the holy man.
The King has heard that Kesi believes in a soul which is different from the
body and reproaches him as follows:

“If you have the conviction
that the soul is different from the body and not the same, I have, on the other
hand, to cite the following. I had a godless, wicked grandfather who did not
administer his Kingdom well and who, after his death must, have reached hell on
account of his bad actions. If now he would come to me who am ever his beloved
grandson-his joy and care-and warn me against living as godlessly as he did, in
order that I should not go to hell, then I would believe that the soul is
different from the body. But as he has not come to warn me, I am convinced that
the soul and the body are the same.”

Thereupon Kesi replied: “If
you notice, oh King, that your wife has given herself up to another man, what
punishment would you inflict on this man ?”

“I would get him executed in
any way.”

“If the man were to request
you that he should be given some time before his execution in order to warn his
relatives and acquaintances against a similar offence, would you grant him also
at least only one moment?”

“No, why should I?”

“Entirely in the same way,
thy godless grandfather, who according to our doctrine, is in hell, has not
come; he has, no doubt, the wish to come to thee his beloved grandson-his joy
and care-in order to warn thee. But he cannot. Because there are the most
diverse grounds that a being tarrying in the hell, however much he would
like to come to men, cannot come. Therefore, believe, Paesi, that the soul is
different from the body.”

And again the King says: “What
you say is merely a comparison and does not apply to the following. I had a
very pious grandmother, who according to your doctrine, must have got, after
her death, into a world of the gods, for her pious acts. If she would come to
me who was her most beloved grandson – her joy and care – and admonish me to
live piously like her in order that 1 should attain the world of the gods, then
I would believe that the soul is different from the body. But she has not come
to admonish me and I am convinced that the soul and the body are the
same.”

Upon this, Kesi knew how to
reply. But Paesi has also made an experiment. He reports for example: “1
was once in my reception-hall surrounded by the distinguished elite of my
kingdom. There the city watchman brought a thief whom they had caught. 1 got
him thrown alive into a brazen pot, with a brass lid strongly soldered laid
over it, with the coppersmith watching over him. After some time, I got the lid
opened and found the man dead, though there was no opening in the pot, through
which the soul could have escaped. Had there been an opening in the jar through
which the soul could have escaped 1 would believe that the soul is different
from the body. But it was not the case. So I am convinced that the soul and the
body are not the same.”

And another experiment: Paesi had
first executed one offender and then got him locked up in a jar and when it was
opened after some time, the corpse was full of worms. The jar, however, had no
opening through which the souls of these worms could have reached the inside.
Another offender was got weighed by Paesi. Then he was killed, except that his
skin only was injured and he was again weighed. But the weight was the same.
Therefore, no soul could have escaped. Another offender he got hacked to pieces
in order to search the soul but it was not to be found. Such other like
experiments were made by Paesi. Kesi knew appropriate answers to all these
arguments and finally Paesi gives himself over as beaten and converted.

This account gives a lively
picture of an old Indian Materialist on the King’s throne. And Paesi was
certainly not the only one of his kind. But however interesting and characteristic
such accounts are, they can rarely claim a place of the same kind in a history
of Indian philosophy. The Materialism gains for it an importance from the moment
only when it emerged in the form of a regular doctrine and took up arms against
the remaining philosophical schools. That occurred also very early. The old
writings of the Buddhistic canons report that, in the time of the Buddha, a
large number of teachers stalked the land and gathered students around
themselves. Among them are found such as represent the materialistic doctrines.2

The oldest Materialistic doctrines: We hear of a certain Purana
Kasyapa who taught the following; “Anybody may do or allow to do anything,
mutilate or allow somebody to be mutilated, roast or allow somebody to be
roasted, persecute, plague, harass or get somebody persecuted, plagued or
harassed, may rob life, steal, break into a house, drag away the loot, plunder
a sequestered house, carry on highwaymanship or brigandage, commit adultery or
lie; but he, with all this, does nothing bad. If anyone, with a razor-sharp
quoit, reduces a living creature on the earth to a heap of flesh, transforms
him into a single lump of flesh, he would thereby prove himself as nothing bad;
it would not appear as anything bad. If any body would go to the southern bank
of the Ganga,3
murdering and allowing somebody to murder, mutilating and allowing somebody to
mutilate, roasting and allowing somebody to roast, he would prove himself as
nothing bad; it would not appear bad. And if he would go to the northern bank
of the Ganga,3 giving gifts and causing them to
be given, sacrificing and causing sacrifices to be offered, it would thereupon
prove in no way meritorious; it would not appear as merit. Through presents,
self-discipline, self-mastery and veracity, there arises or appears no
merit.”

A second teacher Ajita Kdakambala
represented the following view: “There is no gift in charity, there is no
sacrifice, there are no offerings. There is no fruit and ripening of good and
bad actions. There is not this world or that. There is no mother nor father.
There are no suddenly born beings.4 In the world, there are no ascetics and Brahmanas
who have gone along the right path of conduct and follow the right conduct,
who have seen this world and that world out of independent knowledge and
proclaimed it. A man consists of four Elements. When he dies, earth goes into
the mass of earth (prthivikayah), the
water into the mass of water, the fire into the mass of fire, the breath into
the mass of air, and the sense-organs enter into the space (akasah). Four men with the bier as the
fifth carry forth the dead person, and they carryon their talk until they come
into the place of cremation. Then there remain only white bones and all the
sacrifices end in ashes. The gift of charity is, therefore, the doctrine of a
buffoon; it is an empty and false talk when anybody asserts that there is
something. Fools and wise men are destroyed and disappear when the body falls
to pieces. They are no more after death.”

A third teacher finally Kakuda
Katyayana teaches the following:

“There are seven masses (kayah) which are neither created nor
brought forth. They are unfruitful, unchangeable, and are firm like a pillar.
They move not, nor do they change, they do not disturb each other, nor are they
able to procure joy, grief or joy and grief. Which are these seven masses? The
earth-mass, the water-mass, the fire-mass, the air-mass, pleasure, pain and the
souls (jivah) as the seventh. These
seven masses are neither created nor produced, they are unfruitful,
unchangeable, and firm like a pillar. They do not move nor do they change, they
do not disturb one another and they are not able to procure pleasure, pain or
pleasure and pain. There is no murderer, nor one who allows to murder, nor
anyone who hears or allows to hear, no knower or one who allows to know. When
anybody with a sharp sword strikes off a head, nobody robs nobody of life. The
sword passes, on the contrary, through the empty space, between the seven
masses.”

Of these three doctrines, the
first exhausts itself in mere denial of all moral obligations. The second seeks
to prove it with a gross materialism. The third finally represents an ancient
Nature-philosophy which explains all occurrences through the inter-play of a
number of permanent factors. The souls also occur among these factors. But this
doctrine also denies everything transcendent. And all the three are unanimous
in the fact that they deny continuance after death and the moral consequences
arising therefrom, and are, in this sense, genuine materialistic doctrines.

The old writings of the Jaina
also describe similar materialistic doctrines. We, therefore, see that
Materialism arose early in the form of a regular theory. But the development,
thereby, does not remain stationary. It led to the creation of a fully formed
materialistic system which was handed down like all other systems, in the form
of a School-that of the Lokayata.

The Lokayata System: The Lokayata, i.e. the doctrine which concerns
this world, arose in the pre-Christian period. As a founder is regarded one
Carvaka about whom nothing further is known.5 It is characteristic for this
system that it is clothed in the same form like the remaining systems. Like
these, its doctrines are written down in aphorisms which were orally handed
down.6
Further one took care to refer his doctrines to a holy seer of antiquity in the
Brahmanical circles. In a similar way, the Lokayata derived its doctrine from a
higher authority. As we have already heard, the Materialism was connected most
closely with the circles which taught the art of Statecraft. But as the highest
teacher of the art of Statecraft and as its legendary proclaimer was
co.1Sidered Brhaspati, the teacher of the gods and besides him, there was
Usanas, the teachers of the Asuras, the demon,. Accordingly, the Lokayata
traced back their aphorisms to Brhaspati. Besides we also hear of a school
which refers itself to Usanas.

Like the aphorisms of the Vaisesika
and other systems,7 the aphorisms of the Lokayata also begin with
the words: “Now we shall explain the truth.” Now the chief maxims of
the system follow sharply and trenchantly.8 “Earth, water, fire, air: these are the
entities.” “One designates their connection or combination as body,
sense-organs and objects.” “Out of them develops the mind or spirit
itself.” “The knowledge arises like a force of fermenting intoxicant
out of a yeast, etc.” “The expressions of life (jivah) resemble bubbles in water.” “And because there
is nothing that continues in the world beyond, there is, therefore, no world
beyond.”

With this has been said what is
essential of the Lokayata. The man consists only of four elements; there is no
soul. Therefore, there is no beyond and no retribution of good and bad actions.

These short maxims or aphorisms
were explained and further set forth, first in oral and, later on, in written
elucidations. For example, the question was raised by the opponents’ side,
why, when as a matter of fact, everything consists of the elements; the
sentiency emerges only in the human body and not in inanimate things like a pot
or a vessel. Thereupon, the reply was: “The sentiency does not .emerge
into appearance in vessels etc., because the remaining causes are missing, just
as in sand, the force of intoxication or intoxicant does not appear
forth.”9Again,
the force of intoxication, when it is to appear forth, presupposes not only the
presence of necessary things – flour, water and molasses and the remaining
ingredients but also the fact that these must be in a particular condition of
mixture. So also the elements only may produce the sentiency when they appear
in a particular state i.e. in the form of the body as skin, bones, flesh and
blood. In the corpse already, this condition is not preserved unchanged and
therefore sentiency has vanished from it.” In order to derive all the psychical
processes out of the Elements, one took hold of the doctrine of the three
juices in the body–phlegm, bile and wind.10 It was taught that through phlegm, there arises
desire, through bile, hatred and through wind, delusion. The manifoldness of
life-forces, that one experiences in incalculable alternation-now joy, now
grief-was traced by the opponents of the Lokayata to the power of good and bad
actions which, according to the rigorous law of retribution, lead to joy and
grief. This law was denied by the representatives of the Lokayata and they
appealed to the incalculable accidental rise of bubbles in water for
explaining the accidentality of joy and grief. They also asserted that natural
feelings or experiences ascribe all these life-forces to no soul. .Because, for
example, when a man says : “I know” or when a man also says, “I
am lean; I am fat”, he speaks of no soul but only of a body. Because there
is no soul.

The Buddhist teachings demanded a
special comment, as they assumed no soul but only a stream of consciousness
i.e. a connected series of knowledge-moments.11 What was concerned here was not
the contesting of the belief in a soul-which was also denied by the
opponent-but of the proof that the series of knowledge-moments does not endure
uninterrupted and does not continue from one existence to another. Because that
was the proof of these schools in asserting in support of a continuance after
death and of a retribution of good and bad actions. Accordingly, the
representatives of the Lokayata emphasized that the coming into existence of
knowledge was bound up with a body and with entirely definite prerequisites.
Therefore no knowledge comes into existence in the embryo, because the
sense-organs are not still developed an6 there is no object (for them). So also
knowledge is suspended in a state like that of swoon. The knowledge in an
alleged rebirth depends, however, on an entirely another body and is exactly
different, like the body, from an earlier knowledge. There is, therefore, as
little connection as that in the knowledge of two different beings who live
simultaneously near each other. It is not also right to trace back, as one
does, the expression of passions and instinctive behaviour of small children to
experiences in earlier births. For, then, a man must be able to remember
earlier (former) births, not only in Isolated cases asserted by the opponent,
but in general, Just as all people who were together in one village would remember
about it in a similar way .

There is, therefore, no soul, no
survival after death and no retribution of good and bad deeds. When one speaks
of such things, it is only a misuse of words, which originally implied something
quite different.12
The ‘other world’ (paraloka) which
word in India
denotes a peculiar meaning, is nothing else than another place, another time
and another condition.13 Hell is nothing else than grief full of agony. Deliverance
is the destruction of the body. The highest god is an almighty King.

The adherents of the Lokayata
developed and proved their doctrines like this. But there were not only
systematic explanations or proofs with which they met their opponents. They also
knew to use especially effectually the weapon of derision and knew how to make
the opponent a laughing stock. Their derision, in the first place, was directed
against the sacrificial cult of the Brahmanas. They said, for example,14
“If a man after leaving the body enters into a world beyond, why does he
not again come back, driven by the impulse of love or affection to his relatives?”
But the belief in the other world is meaningless. Because, if “a
sacrificer would reap the reward of heaven, after the sacrificer himself, the
sacrificial act and the implements of sacrifice are long gone (into the limbo
of the past), the trees which were consumed by a forest conflagration would as
well bear fruit.” Equally meaningless it is to offer an ancestral
sacrifice to the dead. “If the ancestral offering of worship would be the
source of gratification to the dead, then one could as well feed the flame of a
lamp which is extinguished.” “Fine, indeed, would be any such effect
on the things which are distant. Then a man need not provide provisions (of
food etc.) to the people who go on a journey. Because, then, nothing would prevent
one from satisfying him (his hunger and thirst) by an ancestral offering of
worship performed at home. ! But it is all a swindle! The ceremonies for the
dead which the Brahmanas performed have been performed to provide themselves
with means of maintenance. There is nothing else in that.” Generally,
“the fire-sacrifice, the three Vedas, the bundle of three sticks which the
Brahmanas carry, and the besmearing with ashes serves only as a means of
livelihood for men who lack intelligence and energy for any other occupation.”
“The mortifications, the different self-torments, the self-discipline, the
deceits for the sense-satisfaction and the sacrificial acts like the
fire-sacrifice are regarded as childish play” by reasonable men. If really
that would have been true, “if”, really as the Brahmanas assert,
“the animal slaughtered in the sacrifice would go to heaven, why does not,
then, the sacrificer kill his father in order to despatch him to heaven?”
But “the authors of the Vedas are none else than the three categories of
the crackers of jests, rogues, and nigh t-sneakers, when they utter their
unintelligible gossip, their ‘jarbhari’
and ‘turbhari’ “15 passing
it for the words of wise men. That is why one should not believe in anything of
this kind but should live happily, so long as life lasts. There is nothing
which does not expire after death. Once the body becomes ashes, then there is
no recurrence”.

Thus represents itself in broad
features the doctrine of the Lokayata in the older period. Its
thought-processes are simple and have rarely interfered in the philosophical
development. But they have continually found adherents and their school has
maintained its ground through the whole centuries. Its situation becomes more
difficult at the end of the classical period of Indian philosophy, when logical
and epistemological questions moved to the forefront of interest and when every
system was compelled to take them into consideration, on which their systems
were founded. The adherents of the Lokayata also could not escape this demand.
Originally they made light of the fact. In the sutras of Brhaspati16 it is said: “The inference is not the
means of right knowledge.” One, therefore, appealed only to sense-experience
and simply dismissed the further assertions of the opponent. One could do it so
long as inferences which were arrived at by the antagonistic schools were
simple inferences by analogy. It was enough to show the faultiness of every
conclusion, in order to decline every inference as unreliable. Things, however,
were different, as the opponent developed the firmly grounded scientific
doctrines forming conclusions. One had to discuss these, nay, one was compelled
to establish his own doctrine differently as from what he had done hitherto and
to defend it. Partly one tried to hold fast to the old line, as, for instance,
when one explained:17 “The aphorisms of Brhaspati have only this
aim, viz. to refute the opponent”. But in the majority of cases one
decided to discuss the doctrine of inference and to take it over at least in
parts. This desertion of the original attitude led, in no way, to the
consequence of the decline of the system. The taking up of foreign thoughts
and occupation with them led, on the contrary, to a regular activity and to a
blossoming up of a literature richer than hitherto. We have, however, reached
with it a turning point, in the development, at which we must provisionally
halt.

Also among the other systems with
which we have dealt, we have seen that at the end of the classical period of
Indian philosophy about the middle of the first post-Christian millennium, the
system-building in essentials had come to a close and had been at a
stand-still. In its place there stepped in the forefront the theory of
knowledge and there developed a lively and fruitful activity in this sphere for
several more ·centuries. The presentation of this development, which appears to
a certain extent as a second blossoming of the classical period, we have
hitherto put in the background, in order to handle it separately as an
independent section of Indian philosophy. Now we see that the Lokayata also
came round to the same path about the same time. But before we can go over to
the presentation of these sections of development, there remains for us a group
of systems to handle, which later sprang forth and to which we have referred up
to this time, but which developed themselves to so great importance and
scrambled for the lead through several centuries-namely the systems of the
Buddhists.

Bibiliography

Hillebrandt, A.: Zur Kenntnis der
indischen Materialisten. Aufsatze zur Kultur und Sprachageschichte vornehmlich
des Orients, Ernst Kuhn gewidmet, Miinchen 1916, p. 24-26.

Tucci, G.: Linee di una Storia
del materia1ismo Indiano. Memorie della R. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei,
Serie V, Vol. 17-Fasc. 7/1923 and Serie VI. Vol. 2, Fasc. 10/1929.

Ruben, W. : Materialismus im
Leben des alten Indien, Acta Orientalia XIII, Leiden 1935, p. 128-162 and
177-225.

Dakshina Ranjan Shastri : Short
History of Indian Materialism, Calcutta
1930.

Translations are not mentioned;
apart from a few concise works recently found, in later times, the literature
of the system is lost. Nothing much is to be remarked about my presentation. In
a history of Indian Philosophy, the systematic materialism of the Lokayata must
naturally stand at the middle point or centre. A grouping of scattered
utterances of materialistic views has no value, because therethrough no essentially
new features come forth. For the systematic Lokayata, the most important thing
is the assembling and making use of the available fragments. It is still, up to
this time, not performed in a satisfactory form hut is not difficult for the
older times. Difficulties present themselves only in the post-classical times,
where the thought-processes become complicated and isolated authors and works
become available for consideration. But it falls already out of the limits of
the present volume.

Notes