Ramkrishna Bhattacharya
What are the ontological and
epistemological positions of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata? They may be stated as
follows: The whole of the material world, including the human body, is made of
four basic elements, namely, earth, air, fire and water; there can be no consciousness
without the living body; the spirit has no extracorporeal existence and, far
from being imperishable, it perishes with the death of the body. As a natural
corollary to this ontological position, all religious acts, worship of the
gods, paying obeisance to Brahmin priests, performance of postmortem rites,
etc. are considered absolutely futile.
epistemological positions of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata? They may be stated as
follows: The whole of the material world, including the human body, is made of
four basic elements, namely, earth, air, fire and water; there can be no consciousness
without the living body; the spirit has no extracorporeal existence and, far
from being imperishable, it perishes with the death of the body. As a natural
corollary to this ontological position, all religious acts, worship of the
gods, paying obeisance to Brahmin priests, performance of postmortem rites,
etc. are considered absolutely futile.
The epistemological position
clearly supports this ontology. Perception is admitted to be the only valid
means of knowledge. Inference, in so far as it is based on religious scriptures
alone, is rejected out of hand because the scriptures are not based on
perception but on revelation, not amenable to verification by the senses, and
thus tend to promote irrational faith in the afterlife (rebirth) and the afterworld
(heaven and hell), God, and the omniscient being (like the Buddha or Mahāvīra)
( R. Bhattacharya (2010),2134). In short, the Cārvāka system appeared in the
Indian philosophical scene as materialismus
militans, strongly objecting to and opposing all religious dogmas (not just
Vedism but Buddhism and Jainism as well). Its epistemology was fashioned to
match its ontology, which consisted of a series of negations. The insistence on
empirical verification is the hallmark of this system. In fact one has a
feeling that the Cārvākas first provided the epistemology to the ontology
already current in India
at least from the Buddha’s time, when Ajita Kesakambala had come out with his
proto-materialistic ideas.
clearly supports this ontology. Perception is admitted to be the only valid
means of knowledge. Inference, in so far as it is based on religious scriptures
alone, is rejected out of hand because the scriptures are not based on
perception but on revelation, not amenable to verification by the senses, and
thus tend to promote irrational faith in the afterlife (rebirth) and the afterworld
(heaven and hell), God, and the omniscient being (like the Buddha or Mahāvīra)
( R. Bhattacharya (2010),2134). In short, the Cārvāka system appeared in the
Indian philosophical scene as materialismus
militans, strongly objecting to and opposing all religious dogmas (not just
Vedism but Buddhism and Jainism as well). Its epistemology was fashioned to
match its ontology, which consisted of a series of negations. The insistence on
empirical verification is the hallmark of this system. In fact one has a
feeling that the Cārvākas first provided the epistemology to the ontology
already current in India
at least from the Buddha’s time, when Ajita Kesakambala had come out with his
proto-materialistic ideas.
Commentaries on the Cārvākasῡtra
The question is: Do the
commentators of the base text, whether or not they adhered to materialism,
always reflect the intention of the author/redactor? The aphorisms in the base
text, we must admit, are not self-explanatory; their brevity stands in the way
oaf any satisfactory understanding. Fortunately, however, there are some
aphorisms, the literal meaning of which is fairly transparent. When a
commentator goes beyond the literal meaning of these aphorisms and tries to
extract some other significance by resorting to grammatical and lexical
acrobatics, there is every reason to suspect that he is not being true to the
intention of the author/redactor. In most of the cases, however, the intention
of the aphorism and its interpretations given in the commentaries are at one, although
new instances and further arguments are provided to defend or to elucidate the
position of the base text.
commentators of the base text, whether or not they adhered to materialism,
always reflect the intention of the author/redactor? The aphorisms in the base
text, we must admit, are not self-explanatory; their brevity stands in the way
oaf any satisfactory understanding. Fortunately, however, there are some
aphorisms, the literal meaning of which is fairly transparent. When a
commentator goes beyond the literal meaning of these aphorisms and tries to
extract some other significance by resorting to grammatical and lexical
acrobatics, there is every reason to suspect that he is not being true to the
intention of the author/redactor. In most of the cases, however, the intention
of the aphorism and its interpretations given in the commentaries are at one, although
new instances and further arguments are provided to defend or to elucidate the
position of the base text.
Invariance in intention and interpretation
Here is an example. There are two
aphorisms: (1) “Perception indeed is the (only) means of right knowledge”, and
(2) “Since the means of right knowledge is to be non-secondary (agauṇa), it is difficult to ascertain an object
by means of inference” (III.12. R. Bhattacharya (2009) 80, 87). This has led
to a notion that the Cārvākas believed in one and only one instrument of
cognition, namely, sense perception, while other schools admitted inference,
word (verbal testimony), comparison, etc. in addition to perception. This gave
rise to the obvious criticism that by denying inference, the Cārvākas proved
themselves to be utterly naïve and unfit to be called logicians (cf. NM, I: 9,
Vācaspatimiśra, Bhāmatī on Brahmasῡtra,
3.3.53; C/L 154, 243).
aphorisms: (1) “Perception indeed is the (only) means of right knowledge”, and
(2) “Since the means of right knowledge is to be non-secondary (agauṇa), it is difficult to ascertain an object
by means of inference” (III.12. R. Bhattacharya (2009) 80, 87). This has led
to a notion that the Cārvākas believed in one and only one instrument of
cognition, namely, sense perception, while other schools admitted inference,
word (verbal testimony), comparison, etc. in addition to perception. This gave
rise to the obvious criticism that by denying inference, the Cārvākas proved
themselves to be utterly naïve and unfit to be called logicians (cf. NM, I: 9,
Vācaspatimiśra, Bhāmatī on Brahmasῡtra,
3.3.53; C/L 154, 243).
Did the Cārvākas really hold such
a view? A fragment from the commentary by Purandara has often been cited to
disabuse the critics of this notion.3 Purandara said:”The Cārvākas too admit of
such an inference as is well known in the world, but that which is called
inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them].”
(qtd. TSP 2: 528)
a view? A fragment from the commentary by Purandara has often been cited to
disabuse the critics of this notion.3 Purandara said:”The Cārvākas too admit of
such an inference as is well known in the world, but that which is called
inference [by some], transgressing the worldly way, is prohibited [by them].”
(qtd. TSP 2: 528)
Purandara was not the only one to
explain the aphorism in this way. Aviddhakarṇa,
another commentator, also said: ”It is true that inference is admitted by us as
a source of knowledge, because it is found to be so in general practice; (what
we only point out is that) the definition of a inferential mark is illogical”
(qtd. PVSVṬ 19). He further explained:
“A source of knowledge means an instrument which produces an awareness of an
object not (already) cognized and therefore, is not a source of knowledge,
because it is not an instrument for producing a definite awareness of an
object” (ibid.). Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa too said so and distinguished between the
(1) probanses well established in the world (lokaprasidhhahetu) and (2)
probanses established in the scriptures (tantrasiddhahetu) (qtd. SVR 266). He
resorted to the NyāyaVaiśeṣika
terminology to establish why inference is to be regarded as secondary.
explain the aphorism in this way. Aviddhakarṇa,
another commentator, also said: ”It is true that inference is admitted by us as
a source of knowledge, because it is found to be so in general practice; (what
we only point out is that) the definition of a inferential mark is illogical”
(qtd. PVSVṬ 19). He further explained:
“A source of knowledge means an instrument which produces an awareness of an
object not (already) cognized and therefore, is not a source of knowledge,
because it is not an instrument for producing a definite awareness of an
object” (ibid.). Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa too said so and distinguished between the
(1) probanses well established in the world (lokaprasidhhahetu) and (2)
probanses established in the scriptures (tantrasiddhahetu) (qtd. SVR 266). He
resorted to the NyāyaVaiśeṣika
terminology to establish why inference is to be regarded as secondary.
Some anonymous commentator4
further distinguished between two kinds of inferential cognition: (1) “some in
case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself” (utpannapratīti
) and (2) “some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired on
somebody else’s advice” (utpādyapratīti ) (NM, 1:184). He thereby suggests
that the first kind is valid, the second is not.
further distinguished between two kinds of inferential cognition: (1) “some in
case of which the inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself” (utpannapratīti
) and (2) “some in case of which the inferential cognition is to be acquired on
somebody else’s advice” (utpādyapratīti ) (NM, 1:184). He thereby suggests
that the first kind is valid, the second is not.
Did all these commentators then
desert the original position of the base text? Some modern scholars indeed
think so (Frauwallner (trans.) 2:225, Franco (1991)159, and FrancoPreisendanz
(1998)180). They postulate that the commentators who appeared in the wake of
Dharmakīrti were forced to turn away from the original position of the Cārvākas,
and the admission of inference in howsoever limited a way is a pointer to this
Abkehr (Frauwallner’s word, 2:308).. What is proposed is that this acceptance
of inference was a later development, not exactly consistent with the intention
of the original author and his audience.
desert the original position of the base text? Some modern scholars indeed
think so (Frauwallner (trans.) 2:225, Franco (1991)159, and FrancoPreisendanz
(1998)180). They postulate that the commentators who appeared in the wake of
Dharmakīrti were forced to turn away from the original position of the Cārvākas,
and the admission of inference in howsoever limited a way is a pointer to this
Abkehr (Frauwallner’s word, 2:308).. What is proposed is that this acceptance
of inference was a later development, not exactly consistent with the intention
of the original author and his audience.
It can, however, be demonstrated
that such a view is not well founded. When the philosophers of other schools
speak of inference, word, comparison, etc., they never deny that perception is
the foremost (jyeṣṭha) of all instruments
of cognition (cf. NM, I:164). What they indeed assert is that inference, etc.
are all independent means of knowledge, on a par with perception, not
subservient to it: coordinate, not subordinate. Yet, as the Nyāyasῡtra (1.1.5) declares, inference has to be
preceded by perception. Hence, inference not based on perception cannot be
admitted. Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the very first Nyāya aphorism (1.1.1)
added “scripture” to “perception” (pratyakṣāgmāśritam
anumānam, sā ’nvīkṣā, pratyakṣāgamābhyāmīkṣitasyānvīkṣaṇam
anvīkṣā), which is unwarranted and
amounts to interpolation pure and simple. The base text never speaks of
scripture in connection with inference; it mentions perception alone. The
independent status of perception is an admitted fact in all realist
philosophical systems. So, when the Cārvākas denied the status of inference as
an independent means of knowledge, they ipso facto did not reject all kinds of
inference but accepted only such inference as was found true in everyday
practice (lokavyavahāra). Thus, in the Cārvāka conception perception includes
both what is sensually apprehended and inference based on such apprehension.
Only such inferences as derived from the scripture, Veda and Smṛti, are not admitted. Therefore, all the
four commentators, Purandara, Aviddhakarṇa,
Udbhaṭa and the anonymous one, were not
deserting the original stand of the base text by admitting inference of a
particular sort but only explicating the view of the base text on inference in
relation to perception. Other non-Cārvāka authors too were aware of this,5 as
this was the view of earlier, pre-Cārvāka Indian materialists too.
that such a view is not well founded. When the philosophers of other schools
speak of inference, word, comparison, etc., they never deny that perception is
the foremost (jyeṣṭha) of all instruments
of cognition (cf. NM, I:164). What they indeed assert is that inference, etc.
are all independent means of knowledge, on a par with perception, not
subservient to it: coordinate, not subordinate. Yet, as the Nyāyasῡtra (1.1.5) declares, inference has to be
preceded by perception. Hence, inference not based on perception cannot be
admitted. Vātsyāyana in his commentary on the very first Nyāya aphorism (1.1.1)
added “scripture” to “perception” (pratyakṣāgmāśritam
anumānam, sā ’nvīkṣā, pratyakṣāgamābhyāmīkṣitasyānvīkṣaṇam
anvīkṣā), which is unwarranted and
amounts to interpolation pure and simple. The base text never speaks of
scripture in connection with inference; it mentions perception alone. The
independent status of perception is an admitted fact in all realist
philosophical systems. So, when the Cārvākas denied the status of inference as
an independent means of knowledge, they ipso facto did not reject all kinds of
inference but accepted only such inference as was found true in everyday
practice (lokavyavahāra). Thus, in the Cārvāka conception perception includes
both what is sensually apprehended and inference based on such apprehension.
Only such inferences as derived from the scripture, Veda and Smṛti, are not admitted. Therefore, all the
four commentators, Purandara, Aviddhakarṇa,
Udbhaṭa and the anonymous one, were not
deserting the original stand of the base text by admitting inference of a
particular sort but only explicating the view of the base text on inference in
relation to perception. Other non-Cārvāka authors too were aware of this,5 as
this was the view of earlier, pre-Cārvāka Indian materialists too.
How do we know all this? A
passage in the Mbh, Śāntiparvan (crit. ed. 211.26; vulgate 218.27) says:
passage in the Mbh, Śāntiparvan (crit. ed. 211.26; vulgate 218.27) says:
The conclusion based on inference
and tradition – both are rooted in perception. Perception and testimony (what we
are told to believe in) are identical; reasoned-out truth (=inference) too is
nothing but perception.6
In the Anuśāsanaparvan too
(147.9) three instruments of cognition are mentioned: (a) direct perception
confirmed by the world (lokataḥ siddhaṃ pratyakṣaṃ), (b) doctrines propounded by the
scriptures, and (c) the practice of eminent people (śiṣṭa). Dandekar, the editor of this parvan, observes:
“Presumably, anumāna is to be understood to have been included in pratyakṣa ” (crit. ed., 1119).
(147.9) three instruments of cognition are mentioned: (a) direct perception
confirmed by the world (lokataḥ siddhaṃ pratyakṣaṃ), (b) doctrines propounded by the
scriptures, and (c) the practice of eminent people (śiṣṭa). Dandekar, the editor of this parvan, observes:
“Presumably, anumāna is to be understood to have been included in pratyakṣa ” (crit. ed., 1119).
It was only later, when the
philosophical debates between the Vedists and the nonVedists (the Buddhists
and the Jains in particular) were raging, that the question of inference as an
independent means of knowledge along with word (scripture) assumed a focal
position. Both Vātsyāyana and Jayantabhaṭṭa
spent much of their time and energy to establish the independent status of
inference (cf.C/L, pp. 76ff and 128ff). Inference in fact is the chief, if not
the sole, concern of the Nyāyasῡtra
itself.
philosophical debates between the Vedists and the nonVedists (the Buddhists
and the Jains in particular) were raging, that the question of inference as an
independent means of knowledge along with word (scripture) assumed a focal
position. Both Vātsyāyana and Jayantabhaṭṭa
spent much of their time and energy to establish the independent status of
inference (cf.C/L, pp. 76ff and 128ff). Inference in fact is the chief, if not
the sole, concern of the Nyāyasῡtra
itself.
Therefore, the explication of the
two Cārvāka aphorisms (III.12) made by the commentators merely reiterates and
reinforces the position of the ancient Indian materialists, both preCārvāka
and the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. The commentators, regardless of their differences of
opinion concerning other issues, are unanimous in this regard: they do not
admit the independent status of inference as a means of knowledge, and at the
same time they clearly state that inference based on perception is definitely
admissible and is actually admitted by the Cārvākas. Once we understand this,
much of the lampoon and derisive remarks of its opponents such as Hemacandra
(cf. AYVD, v.20) and others turn out to be mere calumny.
two Cārvāka aphorisms (III.12) made by the commentators merely reiterates and
reinforces the position of the ancient Indian materialists, both preCārvāka
and the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. The commentators, regardless of their differences of
opinion concerning other issues, are unanimous in this regard: they do not
admit the independent status of inference as a means of knowledge, and at the
same time they clearly state that inference based on perception is definitely
admissible and is actually admitted by the Cārvākas. Once we understand this,
much of the lampoon and derisive remarks of its opponents such as Hemacandra
(cf. AYVD, v.20) and others turn out to be mere calumny.
When commentators differ
So far, so good. The position of
the Cārvāka/Lokāyata vis-à-vis inference is made crystal clear by the
commentators. The problem arises when the same set of commentators differ in
their interpretations of certain aphorisms.
the Cārvāka/Lokāyata vis-à-vis inference is made crystal clear by the
commentators. The problem arises when the same set of commentators differ in
their interpretations of certain aphorisms.
Udbhaṭa’s interpretation of the aphorism, “Earth, water, fire and air
are the principles, nothing else (iti)” (I.2. R. Bhattacharya (2009) 80) is a
case in point. The word iti denotes the end.7 Since the Cārvākas accept only
these four elements, not “space” (ākāśa) as the fifth, as some earlier
materialists (cf. R. Bhattacharya (2009) 3341 for sources) and many others
did, they are called four elementalists (bhῡtacatuṣṭayavādins) as opposed to the fiveelementalists
(bhutapañcakavādins). Udbhaṭa,
however, claimed that it was impossible to lay down any fixed number and
essential characteristic of the sources of knowledge (NM, I:52), and objects of
knowledge too are more than four: ‘the word, iti, in the (aphorism), “earth,
water, fire and air iti ” indicates also the possibility of similar objects of
knowledge, other than the earth, etc.’ (qtd. GrBh 1:100).
are the principles, nothing else (iti)” (I.2. R. Bhattacharya (2009) 80) is a
case in point. The word iti denotes the end.7 Since the Cārvākas accept only
these four elements, not “space” (ākāśa) as the fifth, as some earlier
materialists (cf. R. Bhattacharya (2009) 3341 for sources) and many others
did, they are called four elementalists (bhῡtacatuṣṭayavādins) as opposed to the fiveelementalists
(bhutapañcakavādins). Udbhaṭa,
however, claimed that it was impossible to lay down any fixed number and
essential characteristic of the sources of knowledge (NM, I:52), and objects of
knowledge too are more than four: ‘the word, iti, in the (aphorism), “earth,
water, fire and air iti ” indicates also the possibility of similar objects of
knowledge, other than the earth, etc.’ (qtd. GrBh 1:100).
Vādidevasῡri quotes more extensively from Udbhaṭa’s commentary:
The word, iti, does not denote
the end (but) it is illustrative. There are other principles such as
consciousness, sound, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, impression and
others (SVR 1087).
Not satisfied with these
categories, Udbhaṭa further writes:
categories, Udbhaṭa further writes:
“There are also prior nonexistence
of the earth, etc., posterior nonexistence, the mutual difference which are
quite apparent and distinct (from the principles, viz., earth, etc.).” (qtd.
SVR 1087).
Cakradhara clearly stated that
Udbhaṭa was here forsaking the
conventional interpretation (yathāśrutārthatyāgena) (GrBh 1:100).
Udbhaṭa was here forsaking the
conventional interpretation (yathāśrutārthatyāgena) (GrBh 1:100).
Apparently Udbhaṭa was referring to issues that are well
known to the NyāyaVaiśeṣikas. He knew
full well that iti cannot be equated to ityādi (etc.).Yet he attempted to fit
the Cārvāka aphorism into the NyāyaVaiśeṣika
frame.
known to the NyāyaVaiśeṣikas. He knew
full well that iti cannot be equated to ityādi (etc.).Yet he attempted to fit
the Cārvāka aphorism into the NyāyaVaiśeṣika
frame.
This may be considered ingenious,
as is his defence of the Cārvāka position of viewing inference as secondary
(see above). But there is nothing to show that the Cārvākas ever thought in
terms of NyāyaVaiśeṣika categories.
Udbhaṭa does not adduce any new
argument in support of his novel explication (as he does in relation to
inference). On the contrary, he flies in the face of the accepted meaning of
iti and, maybe with the best of intentions, introduces NyāyaVaiśeṣika categories which are quite alien to the
original Cārvāka/Lokāyata.
as is his defence of the Cārvāka position of viewing inference as secondary
(see above). But there is nothing to show that the Cārvākas ever thought in
terms of NyāyaVaiśeṣika categories.
Udbhaṭa does not adduce any new
argument in support of his novel explication (as he does in relation to
inference). On the contrary, he flies in the face of the accepted meaning of
iti and, maybe with the best of intentions, introduces NyāyaVaiśeṣika categories which are quite alien to the
original Cārvāka/Lokāyata.
All this does show marks of what
is sometimes viewed as “growth” or “radical innovation”, but at the same time
it exhibits alien addition as well.8
is sometimes viewed as “growth” or “radical innovation”, but at the same time
it exhibits alien addition as well.8
The Cārvāka view on inference
in the SDS
in the SDS
It is well known that all the
Cārvāka/Lokāyata works, the base text and the commentaries, had disappeared
from India
before the SDS was composed. Not a single verbatim quotation from any Cārvāka
work is found in the whole of the SDS, not even a single name (excepting that
of Bṛhaspati). Whatever the author of
the first chapter of the SDS (SāyaṇaMādhava
himself or someone else) knew about the system was not based on his reading but
most probably on what he had heard from his guru. (It may be added in
parentheses that in ancient India
gurumukhavidyā was sine qua non; no amount of reading would be considered a
fitting substitute for it. See Aiyangar 10. Cf. Jha’s regret, 1:x). Moreover,
it is doubtful whether the guru himself had ever glanced at an authentic
Cārvāka work. Apparently there was a guruśiṣya
paramparā (a continuum from preceptors to disciples) and that was the only
source to learn anything about the Cārvāka. Yet a very cogent argument is found
in the SDS (710;C/L, 250-51) to justify the Cārvāka position regarding the
admissibility of perception alone as a valid instrument of cognition, rejecting
summarily the claims of all others (inference, word, comparison, and upādhi or
absence of a condition).
Cārvāka/Lokāyata works, the base text and the commentaries, had disappeared
from India
before the SDS was composed. Not a single verbatim quotation from any Cārvāka
work is found in the whole of the SDS, not even a single name (excepting that
of Bṛhaspati). Whatever the author of
the first chapter of the SDS (SāyaṇaMādhava
himself or someone else) knew about the system was not based on his reading but
most probably on what he had heard from his guru. (It may be added in
parentheses that in ancient India
gurumukhavidyā was sine qua non; no amount of reading would be considered a
fitting substitute for it. See Aiyangar 10. Cf. Jha’s regret, 1:x). Moreover,
it is doubtful whether the guru himself had ever glanced at an authentic
Cārvāka work. Apparently there was a guruśiṣya
paramparā (a continuum from preceptors to disciples) and that was the only
source to learn anything about the Cārvāka. Yet a very cogent argument is found
in the SDS (710;C/L, 250-51) to justify the Cārvāka position regarding the
admissibility of perception alone as a valid instrument of cognition, rejecting
summarily the claims of all others (inference, word, comparison, and upādhi or
absence of a condition).
Nevertheless it will not be
advisable to accept the passage in the SDS as a statement reflecting the
genuine Cārvāka/Lokāyata view. The reason is this: there is no supporting
evidence in favour of such a representation. Since no authority is mentioned,
the passage should be taken as a formulation made by the learned author of the
SDS, not by a Cārvāka. This is an instance in which the view of the digest-maker
is not to be admitted because of the lack of any corroborative evidence.
advisable to accept the passage in the SDS as a statement reflecting the
genuine Cārvāka/Lokāyata view. The reason is this: there is no supporting
evidence in favour of such a representation. Since no authority is mentioned,
the passage should be taken as a formulation made by the learned author of the
SDS, not by a Cārvāka. This is an instance in which the view of the digest-maker
is not to be admitted because of the lack of any corroborative evidence.
Moreover, no mention is made in
the SDS of the limited validity of inference, as Purandara and others have
unequivocally declared (see above). This is another reason why the passage,
like the so-called Lokāyata aphorisms in the Kāmasῡtra,1.2.26-30, is unacceptable (see R. Bhattacharya (2009), 94-95).
the SDS of the limited validity of inference, as Purandara and others have
unequivocally declared (see above). This is another reason why the passage,
like the so-called Lokāyata aphorisms in the Kāmasῡtra,1.2.26-30, is unacceptable (see R. Bhattacharya (2009), 94-95).
Contradictory interpretations offered by commentators
Now we come to an example of
contradictory explanations. After stating that the principle is the four
elements and that their combination is called the body, sense and object, the
base text says, probably in the very next aphorism, tebhyaś (that is, bhῡtebhyaś) caitanyam (I.24). Literally it
appears to mean:”From them (the elements), consciousness.” As is evident, there
is no supplementary verb to complete the sentence (technically called
adhyāhāra). What was in the mind of the redactor/s of the base text can only be
guessed. Two different suggestions were made by two commentators. One
(anonymous) said: the missing verb should be “is born”; the other (again
anonymous) proposed “is manifested” (TS v.1858, TSP 2: 63334). The two
proposals are contradictory, for, if the first is admitted, the second cannot
be true and vice versa. The first would assert that there can be no
consciousness prior to the existence of a living human body. The second, on the
other hand, would suggest that consciousness is already existent, apart from
and quite independent of the human body; it is manifested when the human body
is formed and born. The second proposal then would mean desertion of the
monistic materialist position traditionally ascribed to the Cārvākas.
contradictory explanations. After stating that the principle is the four
elements and that their combination is called the body, sense and object, the
base text says, probably in the very next aphorism, tebhyaś (that is, bhῡtebhyaś) caitanyam (I.24). Literally it
appears to mean:”From them (the elements), consciousness.” As is evident, there
is no supplementary verb to complete the sentence (technically called
adhyāhāra). What was in the mind of the redactor/s of the base text can only be
guessed. Two different suggestions were made by two commentators. One
(anonymous) said: the missing verb should be “is born”; the other (again
anonymous) proposed “is manifested” (TS v.1858, TSP 2: 63334). The two
proposals are contradictory, for, if the first is admitted, the second cannot
be true and vice versa. The first would assert that there can be no
consciousness prior to the existence of a living human body. The second, on the
other hand, would suggest that consciousness is already existent, apart from
and quite independent of the human body; it is manifested when the human body
is formed and born. The second proposal then would mean desertion of the
monistic materialist position traditionally ascribed to the Cārvākas.
This is not all. Udbhaṭa, writing at least a century or so after
these two anonymous commentators, reopened the issue by challenging the common
understanding of the word tebhyaḥ as
“from these”, taken in the sense of ablative case (fifth declension). In
Sanskrit tebhyaḥ can mean “for these”
as well. Preferring the second meaning, Udbhaṭa
explained the aphorism as: it is for the sake of the four elements that
consciousness comes into being.9 He did not concern himself with the missing
verb but sought to establish a dualist view that consciousness existed apart
from and even prior to matter. He had apparently taken his cue from the second
interpretation (or it may have been derived from Sāṃkhya) and explained this aphorism as follows: “Consciousness is
for (the sake of) elements; consciousness is independent and aids the physical
elements which constitute the body” (qtd. GrBh 2:257).
these two anonymous commentators, reopened the issue by challenging the common
understanding of the word tebhyaḥ as
“from these”, taken in the sense of ablative case (fifth declension). In
Sanskrit tebhyaḥ can mean “for these”
as well. Preferring the second meaning, Udbhaṭa
explained the aphorism as: it is for the sake of the four elements that
consciousness comes into being.9 He did not concern himself with the missing
verb but sought to establish a dualist view that consciousness existed apart
from and even prior to matter. He had apparently taken his cue from the second
interpretation (or it may have been derived from Sāṃkhya) and explained this aphorism as follows: “Consciousness is
for (the sake of) elements; consciousness is independent and aids the physical
elements which constitute the body” (qtd. GrBh 2:257).
Udbhaṭa’s interpretation is not grammatically invalid. There is
indeed a rule in Kātyāyana’s Vārttika (on Aṣṭādhyāyī
1.4.44) that provides for the use of the fourth declension to suggest purpose
or intent (tādarthye caturthī vācyā, Vasu 352). But by saying that
consciousness is independent of the four elements that constitute the human
body Udbhaṭa leaves the door open to a
non-materialist position. The Cārvāka position was essentially monistic: no
body, no consciousness. Even if we take Udbhaṭa
to be a dualistic materialist, it clearly involves desertion of the original
Cārvāka position.
indeed a rule in Kātyāyana’s Vārttika (on Aṣṭādhyāyī
1.4.44) that provides for the use of the fourth declension to suggest purpose
or intent (tādarthye caturthī vācyā, Vasu 352). But by saying that
consciousness is independent of the four elements that constitute the human
body Udbhaṭa leaves the door open to a
non-materialist position. The Cārvāka position was essentially monistic: no
body, no consciousness. Even if we take Udbhaṭa
to be a dualistic materialist, it clearly involves desertion of the original
Cārvāka position.
All this does show signs of
growth but at the same time exhibits a tendency to move away from the original
doctrine. Quite appropriately, therefore, Cakradhara contrasts Udbhaṭa with Bhāvivikta and other ancient Cārvāka
teachers (GrBh 2:257). Unlike them, Udbhaṭa
did not uphold the old, traditionally accepted position. On another occasion,
too, Cakradhara notes that Udbhaṭa
forsook the conventional interpretation (GrBh 1:100).
growth but at the same time exhibits a tendency to move away from the original
doctrine. Quite appropriately, therefore, Cakradhara contrasts Udbhaṭa with Bhāvivikta and other ancient Cārvāka
teachers (GrBh 2:257). Unlike them, Udbhaṭa
did not uphold the old, traditionally accepted position. On another occasion,
too, Cakradhara notes that Udbhaṭa
forsook the conventional interpretation (GrBh 1:100).
Vādidevasῡri too writes, “This respectable veteran twice born (sc. Udbhaṭa) is revealing to us a novel way of answering
criticism.” (SVR 764).
criticism.” (SVR 764).
Here the assertion made by
LaFrague is of seminal importance. Surely the redactor(s) of the base text
could not have meant all three interpretations when he/they framed the
aphorism. Since we have no way of knowing the author’s mind, we must go for a
reasonable conjecture. If he had the second or the third interpretation in
mind, the very basis of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata doctrine would be compromised. The
first two aphorisms clearly state the primacy of the four elements as the
principle (tattva). If consciousness were the principle or one of the
principles, the second aphorism would have said so instead of naming all the
four elements individually and stopping there with a decisive word, iti. So the
second and the third interpretations of the third aphorism are unacceptable.
What led the second and the third interpreters to defy the spirit of the first
three aphorisms is not known to us. But one point is evident: the aphorisms
could mean, both to the author and to his audience, only what the first
interpretation says. The second and the third interpretations definitely
suggest different lines of development away from the intention of the author.
LaFrague is of seminal importance. Surely the redactor(s) of the base text
could not have meant all three interpretations when he/they framed the
aphorism. Since we have no way of knowing the author’s mind, we must go for a
reasonable conjecture. If he had the second or the third interpretation in
mind, the very basis of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata doctrine would be compromised. The
first two aphorisms clearly state the primacy of the four elements as the
principle (tattva). If consciousness were the principle or one of the
principles, the second aphorism would have said so instead of naming all the
four elements individually and stopping there with a decisive word, iti. So the
second and the third interpretations of the third aphorism are unacceptable.
What led the second and the third interpreters to defy the spirit of the first
three aphorisms is not known to us. But one point is evident: the aphorisms
could mean, both to the author and to his audience, only what the first
interpretation says. The second and the third interpretations definitely
suggest different lines of development away from the intention of the author.
Conclusion
Development and growth are only
to be expected of all philosophical systems that continue to exist over the
centuries. Thus we have the development of Sāṃkhya,
which becomes allied to Yoga and becomes a syncretic theistic system. The same
story is repeated when the atheistic Nyāya merges with Vaiśeṣika and becomes a theistic system. Such
syncretic doctrines doubtless reflect development and growth. Nevertheless,
they are not to be identified with the original Sāṃkhya or the original Nyāya or the original Vaiśeṣika. When we speak of development and
growth, which are admittedly inevitable, we should not turn a blind eye to the
fact that later works often move away from the original position of the system.
It is not the case that all forms of development and growth necessarily reflect
the original intention of the author.
to be expected of all philosophical systems that continue to exist over the
centuries. Thus we have the development of Sāṃkhya,
which becomes allied to Yoga and becomes a syncretic theistic system. The same
story is repeated when the atheistic Nyāya merges with Vaiśeṣika and becomes a theistic system. Such
syncretic doctrines doubtless reflect development and growth. Nevertheless,
they are not to be identified with the original Sāṃkhya or the original Nyāya or the original Vaiśeṣika. When we speak of development and
growth, which are admittedly inevitable, we should not turn a blind eye to the
fact that later works often move away from the original position of the system.
It is not the case that all forms of development and growth necessarily reflect
the original intention of the author.
The critics of the
Cārvāka/Lokāyata, we have seen, knew only too well that Udbhaṭa had taken a position that was quite
different from the original one. Are we to call this development? When new
facts and arguments are proposed to affirm the contention of the base text in
order to reassert its validity, as viewed by its later adherents or
explicators, such events may very well be called development. On the other
hand, when quite novel but contrary positions are proposed, presumably to
support the contention of the aphorisms in a different way, the event cannot
but be called inconsistency. Such inconsistencies may gain currency over the
course of time and become a part of the tradition of this or that system, but
they evince inconsistency all the same.
Cārvāka/Lokāyata, we have seen, knew only too well that Udbhaṭa had taken a position that was quite
different from the original one. Are we to call this development? When new
facts and arguments are proposed to affirm the contention of the base text in
order to reassert its validity, as viewed by its later adherents or
explicators, such events may very well be called development. On the other
hand, when quite novel but contrary positions are proposed, presumably to
support the contention of the aphorisms in a different way, the event cannot
but be called inconsistency. Such inconsistencies may gain currency over the
course of time and become a part of the tradition of this or that system, but
they evince inconsistency all the same.
This happened to Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and other systems. The Brahmasῡtra in fact has been interpreted in a dozen
different ways by its commentators, so much so that it is impossible to assert
what Bādarāyaṇa, to whom the authorship
of the base text is attributed, had in mind. Yet it cannot be denied that he
must have had something in his mind which the commentators in their zeal to
establish their own philosophical systems have more than once misused,
sometimes going against the position he held. After all Bādarāyaṇa could not have been a dualist, a non-dualist,
a modified non-dualist, a realist, a subjective idealist, etc. all at the same
time! It is therefore futile to think of the Vedānta doctrine. We have several
Vedānta doctrines. That is all.
different ways by its commentators, so much so that it is impossible to assert
what Bādarāyaṇa, to whom the authorship
of the base text is attributed, had in mind. Yet it cannot be denied that he
must have had something in his mind which the commentators in their zeal to
establish their own philosophical systems have more than once misused,
sometimes going against the position he held. After all Bādarāyaṇa could not have been a dualist, a non-dualist,
a modified non-dualist, a realist, a subjective idealist, etc. all at the same
time! It is therefore futile to think of the Vedānta doctrine. We have several
Vedānta doctrines. That is all.
Vedanta is of course an extreme
case. But Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and the
Cārvāka systems also exhibit several different approaches, not all of which can
be considered consistent with the view of the original authors and their
audiences. In order to study these systems, instead of concentrating solely on
the doctrine, a historicist approach is essential in order to trace their
developments and note where and how some commentators moved away from the
original position. Whenever there is a sign of any forced explanation,
inconsistent with grammar and conventional use, it has to be taken as a case of
inconsistency. The more the commentator tries to hold fast to the words of the
aphorism but interprets them by doing violence to these two criteria (grammar
and conventional use), the more certain it is that he is moving away from the
original position. Udbhaṭa’s
interpretations of iti and tebhyaḥ are
cases in point. Polemicists like Jayantabhaṭṭa
may not distinguish between the original position and the new position, but a
student of philosophy cannot afford not to do so. Having no axe to grind either
in defense or reputation of any system,10 one should first ascertain, as best
as one can, what the doctrine meant to its author and its audience, and then
proceed to study the development of the system over the ages. No other approach
can do justice to the systems of philosophy in India that flourished and continued
to hold sway over one or the other section of the people for several centuries.
case. But Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā and the
Cārvāka systems also exhibit several different approaches, not all of which can
be considered consistent with the view of the original authors and their
audiences. In order to study these systems, instead of concentrating solely on
the doctrine, a historicist approach is essential in order to trace their
developments and note where and how some commentators moved away from the
original position. Whenever there is a sign of any forced explanation,
inconsistent with grammar and conventional use, it has to be taken as a case of
inconsistency. The more the commentator tries to hold fast to the words of the
aphorism but interprets them by doing violence to these two criteria (grammar
and conventional use), the more certain it is that he is moving away from the
original position. Udbhaṭa’s
interpretations of iti and tebhyaḥ are
cases in point. Polemicists like Jayantabhaṭṭa
may not distinguish between the original position and the new position, but a
student of philosophy cannot afford not to do so. Having no axe to grind either
in defense or reputation of any system,10 one should first ascertain, as best
as one can, what the doctrine meant to its author and its audience, and then
proceed to study the development of the system over the ages. No other approach
can do justice to the systems of philosophy in India that flourished and continued
to hold sway over one or the other section of the people for several centuries.
Let me reiterate: there is no
gainsaying that some changes are inevitable in any system of philosophy because
of its constant interface with other systems. But we should not view all such
changes on a par with one another. Doctrinal or religious bias should not make
us forget that in pre-modern India
a master of philosophy was supposed to be a master of all philosophical
systems, living or dead, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata not excepted. Consider, for
instance, the praise of Vyomaśiva (or Vyomaśambhu or Vyomeśa) in the Ranode
stone inscription (Epigraphia Indica, 1:358) in which Vyomaśiva is eulogized as
lokāyate sadgurur bbuddho buddhamate jinoktiṣu
jinaḥ, Sadguru (Brhaspati) in the
Lokayāta, the Buddha in the doctrine of the Buddha, and Jina (Mahāvīra) in the
sayings of the Jina (line 37). Had it been otherwise, the authors of
philosophical digests and compendia from Haribhadra (eighth century) down to
Cimaṇabhaṭṭa
(nineteenth century) would not have included in their works all systems, both
orthodox and heterodox, known to them.
gainsaying that some changes are inevitable in any system of philosophy because
of its constant interface with other systems. But we should not view all such
changes on a par with one another. Doctrinal or religious bias should not make
us forget that in pre-modern India
a master of philosophy was supposed to be a master of all philosophical
systems, living or dead, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata not excepted. Consider, for
instance, the praise of Vyomaśiva (or Vyomaśambhu or Vyomeśa) in the Ranode
stone inscription (Epigraphia Indica, 1:358) in which Vyomaśiva is eulogized as
lokāyate sadgurur bbuddho buddhamate jinoktiṣu
jinaḥ, Sadguru (Brhaspati) in the
Lokayāta, the Buddha in the doctrine of the Buddha, and Jina (Mahāvīra) in the
sayings of the Jina (line 37). Had it been otherwise, the authors of
philosophical digests and compendia from Haribhadra (eighth century) down to
Cimaṇabhaṭṭa
(nineteenth century) would not have included in their works all systems, both
orthodox and heterodox, known to them.
Notes
3. S. Mookerjee (36869), S. N.
Dasgupta (3:539) and others (for instance, M.K. Gangopadhyaya, 32, 55 n1, 56
n4, 66 n51, and D. Chattopadhyaya, 52) drew attention to this significant
passage from time to time, which however was completely ignored or overlooked
by many modern scholars, as by ancient authors. They continued to ascribe the
onepramāṇa position to the Cārvākas
(more appropriate to Bhartṛhari, who
considered āgama (scripture) to be the one and only valid means of knowledge.
See R. Bhattacharya (2009) 11718, 152).
Dasgupta (3:539) and others (for instance, M.K. Gangopadhyaya, 32, 55 n1, 56
n4, 66 n51, and D. Chattopadhyaya, 52) drew attention to this significant
passage from time to time, which however was completely ignored or overlooked
by many modern scholars, as by ancient authors. They continued to ascribe the
onepramāṇa position to the Cārvākas
(more appropriate to Bhartṛhari, who
considered āgama (scripture) to be the one and only valid means of knowledge.
See R. Bhattacharya (2009) 11718, 152).
4. Jayantabhaṭṭa ascribed this view to “the more learned
ones” (NM 1:184). The use of plural may not be honorific but satirical. The
identity of this commentator (or commentators) is not known. Cakradhara,
however, mentions that by “cunning Cārvāka” and the “learned ones” Jayanta
meant Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa (GrBh 1:52,100). Most probably the designation, “more
learned ones,” refers to some commentator(s) other than Udbhaṭa, signified by the use of the comparative
degree. It may mean Purandara and his followers.
ones” (NM 1:184). The use of plural may not be honorific but satirical. The
identity of this commentator (or commentators) is not known. Cakradhara,
however, mentions that by “cunning Cārvāka” and the “learned ones” Jayanta
meant Udbhaṭabhaṭṭa (GrBh 1:52,100). Most probably the designation, “more
learned ones,” refers to some commentator(s) other than Udbhaṭa, signified by the use of the comparative
degree. It may mean Purandara and his followers.
5. Guṇaratna (TRD on ṢDSam,
v. 83), Ratnaprabhā (on PNTA 540. See R. Bhattacharya (2010) 30), and
the anonymous authors of Avacῡrṇi (on ṢDSam,
v. 83) and SMS (15) (R. Bhattacharya (2009) 11617, 168) quite unambiguously
refer to this interpretation.
v. 83), Ratnaprabhā (on PNTA 540. See R. Bhattacharya (2010) 30), and
the anonymous authors of Avacῡrṇi (on ṢDSam,
v. 83) and SMS (15) (R. Bhattacharya (2009) 11617, 168) quite unambiguously
refer to this interpretation.
6. Bronkhorst translates this verse somewhat
differently (310) but his interpretation too refers to direct perception as the
root of all true knowledge.
differently (310) but his interpretation too refers to direct perception as the
root of all true knowledge.
7. Explaining KA 1.2.10 (sāṃkhyaṃ
yogo lokāyataṃ cetyānvīkṣikī ) Jacobi says: ”According to Kautilya
the essence of philosophy lies in systematic investigation and logical
demonstration; in his judgement these conditions are satisfied only (iti) by Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata” (102) .
yogo lokāyataṃ cetyānvīkṣikī ) Jacobi says: ”According to Kautilya
the essence of philosophy lies in systematic investigation and logical
demonstration; in his judgement these conditions are satisfied only (iti) by Sāṃkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata” (102) .
8. Karin Preisendanz (2008)
apparently does not consider such alien additions to be of much significance.
She classifies commentaries into two kinds: i) creative, ii) philosophically
unproductive (60911). In her usage Udbhaṭa
would be considered creative in the sense of being “philosophically
productive”. But as both Cakradhara and Vādidevasῡri
noted (see below), Udbhaṭa was known to
be an innovator and hence was contrasted to Bhāvivikta who apparently remained
true to the spirit of the base text (GrBh 2:25758). Udbhaṭa was not treated on a par with Bhāvivikta
and others, since he did not represent the views of the ancient (cirantana)
Cārvāka teachers. Similarly, when Solomon calls Udbhaṭa “a progressive Cārvāka” (990) she implicitly admits that he
did not adhere strictly to the original stand of the school.
apparently does not consider such alien additions to be of much significance.
She classifies commentaries into two kinds: i) creative, ii) philosophically
unproductive (60911). In her usage Udbhaṭa
would be considered creative in the sense of being “philosophically
productive”. But as both Cakradhara and Vādidevasῡri
noted (see below), Udbhaṭa was known to
be an innovator and hence was contrasted to Bhāvivikta who apparently remained
true to the spirit of the base text (GrBh 2:25758). Udbhaṭa was not treated on a par with Bhāvivikta
and others, since he did not represent the views of the ancient (cirantana)
Cārvāka teachers. Similarly, when Solomon calls Udbhaṭa “a progressive Cārvāka” (990) she implicitly admits that he
did not adhere strictly to the original stand of the school.
9. This second position is
reminiscent of Sri Aurobindo’s realist but antimaterialist stand regarding
matter visàvis consciousness . Unlike the nondualist Vedantins like Śaṅkara he admitted this world to be real but
added:
reminiscent of Sri Aurobindo’s realist but antimaterialist stand regarding
matter visàvis consciousness . Unlike the nondualist Vedantins like Śaṅkara he admitted this world to be real but
added:
[T]here is a course of life and consciousness originally alien to Matter
which has yet entered into an occupied Matter, – perhaps from another world.
From whence, otherwise, can it have come…nothing can evolve out of Matter which
is not therein already contained. (96-97).
Sri Aurobindo does not accept the
dualist position of Sāṃkhya either, nor
does he regard Śaṅkara’s theory of
illusion as valid (11).
dualist position of Sāṃkhya either, nor
does he regard Śaṅkara’s theory of
illusion as valid (11).
10. No less a savant than Louis de
Vallée Poussin, because of his idealist mindset, calls materialists
“philosophers without philosophy” (8:494). Speaking of the parable of the
Wolf’s Footprint (ṢDSam, v.81), he
writes: ‘A man who wanted to convert – let us say “pervert” – a woman to his
materialist opinion…’ (ibid.). All this in an encyclopaedia article!
Vallée Poussin, because of his idealist mindset, calls materialists
“philosophers without philosophy” (8:494). Speaking of the parable of the
Wolf’s Footprint (ṢDSam, v.81), he
writes: ‘A man who wanted to convert – let us say “pervert” – a woman to his
materialist opinion…’ (ibid.). All this in an encyclopaedia article!
To cite another example, nearer home: B. Bhattacharya
proposed to identify Kambalāśvatara of theTS with the Kambalāśvatara mentioned
in the Saṅgītāloka on the
following ground: “It is not at all strange that a member of a materialist sect
should devote himself to music; disbelieving in transmigration of soul or in a
future life the cultivation of pleasure in this life should seem logical and
entirely proper” (xxxviii).
proposed to identify Kambalāśvatara of theTS with the Kambalāśvatara mentioned
in the Saṅgītāloka on the
following ground: “It is not at all strange that a member of a materialist sect
should devote himself to music; disbelieving in transmigration of soul or in a
future life the cultivation of pleasure in this life should seem logical and
entirely proper” (xxxviii).
Abbreviations and Bibliography
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Acknowledgements: Dipak Bhattacharya, Amitava
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This is the Part-II of the paper initially published in Journal of Indian Philosophy (Springer Netherlands) in 2010. You can read Part I of the essay here
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