What is Materialism?
Before proceeding to details, it
is necessary to understand what, in the philosophical context, materialism
stands for.
is necessary to understand what, in the philosophical context, materialism
stands for.
George Stack has recently defined materialism as follows:
Materialism
is a set of theories which holds that all entities and processes are composed
of—or are reducible to—matter, material forces or physical processes. All
events and facts are explainable, actually or in principle, in terms of body,
material objects or dynamic material changes or movements.1
Keith Campbell enumerates three
basic tenets of materialism:
basic tenets of materialism:
- Everything that is, is
material- Everything can be explained on
the basis of laws involving only the antecedent physical conditions.- There is a cause for every
event.2
Campbell also cautions the naive
reader that metaphysical materialism does not entail the psychological
disposition to pursue money and tangible goods despite the popular use of
‘materialistic’ to describe this interest. 3
reader that metaphysical materialism does not entail the psychological
disposition to pursue money and tangible goods despite the popular use of
‘materialistic’ to describe this interest. 3
The Indian Context
Those who have had their
initiation in philosophy through the Western tradition feel baffled when they
encounter the Indian scenario. Instead of individual philosophers, they find a
number of philosophical schools. Despite certain basic similarities in their
approaches, they contend against one another regarding several issues that are
quite alien to the Western tradition. Belief in rebirth is, for example,
axiomatic to nearly all the Indian schools, be it Brahminical, Jain or
Buddhist. Their sole aim is to find a way to escape from the cycle of birth,
death and rebirth. This is what is meant by mukti,
moksa or nirvana. Whether
subjective idealist or realist, theist or atheist, adhering to the doctrine of
the inerrancy of the Vedas or not, each of these schools believed that it alone
could provide a way to deliverance from all earthly sufferings.
initiation in philosophy through the Western tradition feel baffled when they
encounter the Indian scenario. Instead of individual philosophers, they find a
number of philosophical schools. Despite certain basic similarities in their
approaches, they contend against one another regarding several issues that are
quite alien to the Western tradition. Belief in rebirth is, for example,
axiomatic to nearly all the Indian schools, be it Brahminical, Jain or
Buddhist. Their sole aim is to find a way to escape from the cycle of birth,
death and rebirth. This is what is meant by mukti,
moksa or nirvana. Whether
subjective idealist or realist, theist or atheist, adhering to the doctrine of
the inerrancy of the Vedas or not, each of these schools believed that it alone
could provide a way to deliverance from all earthly sufferings.
However, there was one
philosophical school which did not start from the premise that darsana was moksa-sastra. The very concept of deliverance and whatever it
entailed were objects of ridicule to this school. This school is known as the Carvaka or Lokayata.
philosophical school which did not start from the premise that darsana was moksa-sastra. The very concept of deliverance and whatever it
entailed were objects of ridicule to this school. This school is known as the Carvaka or Lokayata.
The Carvakas and the Pre-Socratics
Unlike the other schools of
Indian philosophy, the Carvakas resemble the early materialist tradition of
philosophy in ancient Greece.
Both the Pre-Socratic philosophers and the Carvakas started from the premise of
four elements as constituting the whole world. Matter to them was primary;
consciousness could not exist without a material substratum. The presence of
God or gods was irrelevant to them. They intended to view the world in terms of
nature in its various manifestations. This kind of approach was so unique that
the materialists, both in India
and Greece,
had to suffer misrepresentation in the hands of their opponents.
Indian philosophy, the Carvakas resemble the early materialist tradition of
philosophy in ancient Greece.
Both the Pre-Socratic philosophers and the Carvakas started from the premise of
four elements as constituting the whole world. Matter to them was primary;
consciousness could not exist without a material substratum. The presence of
God or gods was irrelevant to them. They intended to view the world in terms of
nature in its various manifestations. This kind of approach was so unique that
the materialists, both in India
and Greece,
had to suffer misrepresentation in the hands of their opponents.
The problem of understanding
materialism is bedeviled by the fact that the original writings of the Indian
and the Greek materialists are available only in fragments, quoted or
paraphrased in the works of their opponents and others. Despite this limitation
it is still possible to reconstruct, with some degree of certainty, the
philosophical position of the Carvakas, as similar attempts have been made in
case of their Greek counterparts.
materialism is bedeviled by the fact that the original writings of the Indian
and the Greek materialists are available only in fragments, quoted or
paraphrased in the works of their opponents and others. Despite this limitation
it is still possible to reconstruct, with some degree of certainty, the
philosophical position of the Carvakas, as similar attempts have been made in
case of their Greek counterparts.
In what follows we shall try to
trace the development of materialism in ancient India.
trace the development of materialism in ancient India.
Materialism before the Carvaka/Lokayata
Scepticism about the generally
accepted views regarding the origin of the universe is encountered in the Rgveda
itself. A famous hymn ends with the following verses:
accepted views regarding the origin of the universe is encountered in the Rgveda
itself. A famous hymn ends with the following verses:
But, after all, who knows, and
who can say
whence it all came, and how
creation happened?
The gods themselves are later
than creation,
so who knows truly whence it has
arisen?
Whence all creation had its
origin,
he, whether he fashioned it or
whether he did not,
he, who surveys it all from
highest heaven,
he knows—or maybe even he does not know.4
(10. 129. 67)
However, when we come to the Chandogya Upanisad (6.1ff) we meet the
first inklings of materialism in Uddalaka. In the Buddhist sources we read of
Ajita Kesakambala, a senior contemporary of the Buddha, who preached:
first inklings of materialism in Uddalaka. In the Buddhist sources we read of
Ajita Kesakambala, a senior contemporary of the Buddha, who preached:
There is no (consequence to) almsgiving,
sacrifice or oblation. A good or bad action produces no result. This world does
not exist; nor does the other world. There is no mother, no father (all good or
evil done to them produces no result). There is no rebirth of beings after
death. In this world, there are no samanas
[sramanas] or Brahmanas established in the Noble Path and accomplished in
good practice, who, through direct knowledge acquired by their own efforts, can
expound on this world and the other world. This being is but a compound of the
four great primary elements; after death, the earth-element (or element of
extension) returns and goes back to the body of the earth, the water-element (or
element of cohesion) returns and goes back to the body of water, the fire-element
(or element of thermal energy) returns and goes back to the body of fire, and
air-element (or element of motion) returns and goes back to the body of air,
while the mental faculties pass on into space. The four pallbearers and bier
(constituting the fifth) carry the corpse. The remains of the dead can be seen
up to the cemetery where bare bones lie graying like the colour of the pigeons.
All almsgiving ends in ashes. Fools prescribe almsgiving; and some assert
that there is such a thing as merit in almsgiving; but their words are empty,
false and nonsensical. Both the fool and the wise are annihilated and destroyed
after death and dissolution of their bodies. Nothing exists after death.5
The passage contains most of theelements of the materialist system which flourished in the seventh or eighth
century CE and came to be known as the Carvaka/ Lokayata. Jabali in the Ramayana (Ayodhya Kanda, 100. 217)
echoes Ajita Kesakambala in many respects; the Mahabharata (Santi Parvan, 211. 2230) and some of the Puranas such
as the Padma Purana and the Visnu Purana and an Upapurana, the Visnudharmottara Mahapurana, also
contain references to materialism. These texts and some others seem to refer to
some pre-Carvaka materialist ideas. They anticipate the Carvaka view except in
one respect: they speak of five natural elements, namely, earth, air, fire,
water and space, while the Carvakas reject the fifth, presumably because space
is not perceptible to the senses. Some of the Pre-Socratic philosophers,
however, do not speak of all the four as the basic elements. Thales took water
alone to be so, Anaximenes, air, Heraclitus, fire, etc. But there are others
who thought of the aggregate of all the four elements as arche (origin).
Sources for the Carvaka/Lokayata
As mentioned before, no texts of
the Carvaka/Lokayata have survived. Hence we have to depend exclusively on the
works of its opponents who polemicized against materialism. There are also a
few philosophical digests that offer a summarized version of the Carvaka/Lokayata,
although their representation is not always beyond question. However, the basic
tenets can be gathered from various Brahminical, Jain and Buddhist works. It is
certain that there was at least one collection of aphorisms (sutras), brief, terse statements setting
down the fundamental position of the system. Second, several commentaries on
this work (no fewer than five) were also composed at different times. Third, a number
of verses and satirical epigrams were current till the fourteenth century when
Sayana Madhava wrote his philosophical compendium, Sarva-darsana-samgraha (SDS).
Of these three sources, the first two can be admitted as more or less authentic
and hence reliable evidence. But the third is of dubious authenticity, for some
of them might have been composed by Buddhist and Jain poets, who, along with
the Carvakas, ridiculed the Vedic rituals involving animal sacrifice. However,
the verses and epigrams contain nothing more than what can be found in the
first two sources. They merely confirm rather than add to our knowledge of the
Carvaka system.
the Carvaka/Lokayata have survived. Hence we have to depend exclusively on the
works of its opponents who polemicized against materialism. There are also a
few philosophical digests that offer a summarized version of the Carvaka/Lokayata,
although their representation is not always beyond question. However, the basic
tenets can be gathered from various Brahminical, Jain and Buddhist works. It is
certain that there was at least one collection of aphorisms (sutras), brief, terse statements setting
down the fundamental position of the system. Second, several commentaries on
this work (no fewer than five) were also composed at different times. Third, a number
of verses and satirical epigrams were current till the fourteenth century when
Sayana Madhava wrote his philosophical compendium, Sarva-darsana-samgraha (SDS).
Of these three sources, the first two can be admitted as more or less authentic
and hence reliable evidence. But the third is of dubious authenticity, for some
of them might have been composed by Buddhist and Jain poets, who, along with
the Carvakas, ridiculed the Vedic rituals involving animal sacrifice. However,
the verses and epigrams contain nothing more than what can be found in the
first two sources. They merely confirm rather than add to our knowledge of the
Carvaka system.
The Carvaka Fragments
(a) Aphorisms
Let me first quote the aphorisms
which can be taken as more or less genuine, i.e., emanating from Carvaka
sources.6
which can be taken as more or less genuine, i.e., emanating from Carvaka
sources.6
1. Materialism
1.1 We shall now explain the principle.
1.2 Earth, water, fire and air are the principles, nothing else.
1.3 Their combination is called the ‘body’, ‘sense’, and ‘object’.
1.4 Consciousness (arises or is manifested) out of these.
1.5 As the power of intoxication (arises
or is manifested) from the constituent parts of the wine (such as flour, water
and molasses).
or is manifested) from the constituent parts of the wine (such as flour, water
and molasses).
1.6 The self is (nothing but) the body endowed with consciousness.
1.7 From the body itself.
1.8 Because of the existence (of consciousness) where there is a
body.
body.
1.9 Souls are like water bubbles.
2. The Doctrine of Inherent Nature (lit. Own Being, svabhava)
2.1 The world is varied due to the variation of origin.
2.2 As the eye in a peacock’s tail.
3. The Doctrine of the Primacy of Perception
3.1 Perception indeed is the (only) means of right knowledge.
3.2 Since the means of right knowledge
is to be non-secondary, it is difficult to ascertain an object by means of
inference.
is to be non-secondary, it is difficult to ascertain an object by means of
inference.
4. The Doctrine of the Denial of Rebirth and the Other-World
4.1 There is no means of knowledge for
determining (the existence of) the otherworld.
determining (the existence of) the otherworld.
4.2 There is no otherworld because of
the absence of any otherworldly being (i.e., the transmigrating self).
the absence of any otherworldly being (i.e., the transmigrating self).
4.3 Due to the insubstantiality of consciousness (residing) in the
otherworld.
otherworld.
5. The Doctrine of the Uselessness of Performing Religious Acts
5.1 Religious act is not to be performed.
5.2 Its (religion’s) instructions are not to be relied upon.
It is to be noted that there is
not a single aphorism advocating hedonism. The opponents of the Carvaka often
bring this charge against materialism, but they have never been able to cite a
single aphorism purporting to do so. Second, although some of the aphorisms are
negative statements, the majority of them (13 out of 18) do affirm the positive
tenets of materialism. So the charge brought against them, that no positive
precept is prescribed in their works, is baseless.7
not a single aphorism advocating hedonism. The opponents of the Carvaka often
bring this charge against materialism, but they have never been able to cite a
single aphorism purporting to do so. Second, although some of the aphorisms are
negative statements, the majority of them (13 out of 18) do affirm the positive
tenets of materialism. So the charge brought against them, that no positive
precept is prescribed in their works, is baseless.7
(b) Fragments of the Commentaries
The fragments of the commentaries
mostly refer to aphorisms 1.1, 2, 4 and 3.1, 2. The Carvaka apparently
developed along the line of the other philosophical systems of India. The
commentary and sub-commentary tradition is not always consistent in every
respect. The commentators and sub-commentators sometimes manipulated the
aphorisms to suggest what they would like them to mean. It is therefore
necessary to take note of the Carvaka/Lokayatika philosophers known to us.
mostly refer to aphorisms 1.1, 2, 4 and 3.1, 2. The Carvaka apparently
developed along the line of the other philosophical systems of India. The
commentary and sub-commentary tradition is not always consistent in every
respect. The commentators and sub-commentators sometimes manipulated the
aphorisms to suggest what they would like them to mean. It is therefore
necessary to take note of the Carvaka/Lokayatika philosophers known to us.
The names of two Carvaka
philosophers are given in Santaraksita’s Tattvasangraha
and Kamalasila’s Pañjika‚.8 One
is called Kambalasvatara and the other, Purandara. Purandara’s vrtti (gloss), apparently on the
collection of the sutras, is
mentioned in a Prakrit work, Pupphadanta (Puspadanta)’s Mahapurana and Vadidevasuri’s Syadvada-ratnakara.
It should be noted that Santaraksita and Kamalasila were Buddhists while
Pupphadanta and Vadidevasuri were Jains.
philosophers are given in Santaraksita’s Tattvasangraha
and Kamalasila’s Pañjika‚.8 One
is called Kambalasvatara and the other, Purandara. Purandara’s vrtti (gloss), apparently on the
collection of the sutras, is
mentioned in a Prakrit work, Pupphadanta (Puspadanta)’s Mahapurana and Vadidevasuri’s Syadvada-ratnakara.
It should be noted that Santaraksita and Kamalasila were Buddhists while
Pupphadanta and Vadidevasuri were Jains.
The third name is Aviddhakarna,
which is found in the Nyaya-viniscaya-vivarana
by Vadirajasuri, Siddhi-viniscaya-tika‚
by Anantavirya, Pramanavarttika-svopajñavrtti-tika‚
by Karnakagomin, and Tattvasangraha-pañjika‚
by Kamalasila. The name of his commentary is also given by Kamalasila: Tattvatika‚. All that can be said about
these three commentators is that they must have flourished in or before the
eighth century.
which is found in the Nyaya-viniscaya-vivarana
by Vadirajasuri, Siddhi-viniscaya-tika‚
by Anantavirya, Pramanavarttika-svopajñavrtti-tika‚
by Karnakagomin, and Tattvasangraha-pañjika‚
by Kamalasila. The name of his commentary is also given by Kamalasila: Tattvatika‚. All that can be said about
these three commentators is that they must have flourished in or before the
eighth century.
Cakradhara mentions the fourth
name, Bhavivikta, whom he describes as a cirantana-carvaka,
a traditional Carvaka. He may have written his commentary even before Kambalasvatara
and Purandara. Unfortunately no extract from his work has been quoted in Granthibhanga
by Cakradhara.
name, Bhavivikta, whom he describes as a cirantana-carvaka,
a traditional Carvaka. He may have written his commentary even before Kambalasvatara
and Purandara. Unfortunately no extract from his work has been quoted in Granthibhanga
by Cakradhara.
The fifth and so far the last
commentator we know of is Udbhatabhatta, also mentioned as Bhattodbhata. This
Udbhata might be identical with the rhetorician from Kashmir.
Kalhana in his Rajatarangini„ mentions
a minister bearing the same name. As regards Kambalasvatara and Purandara, all
that can be said is that they belonged to the eighth century or before. As to
Udbhata, if all the Udbhatas were the same, we may fix the time at the ninth
century. His name occurs in Syadvadaratnakara
and Granthibhanga. Vadidevasuri
respectfully refers to him as ‘a venerable old twice-born’ (jarad-dvijanma-mahanubhavah).
Considerably long extracts from Udbhata’s commentary are quoted as the
exponent’s view (purvapaksa) by Cakradhara and Vadidevasuri.
commentator we know of is Udbhatabhatta, also mentioned as Bhattodbhata. This
Udbhata might be identical with the rhetorician from Kashmir.
Kalhana in his Rajatarangini„ mentions
a minister bearing the same name. As regards Kambalasvatara and Purandara, all
that can be said is that they belonged to the eighth century or before. As to
Udbhata, if all the Udbhatas were the same, we may fix the time at the ninth
century. His name occurs in Syadvadaratnakara
and Granthibhanga. Vadidevasuri
respectfully refers to him as ‘a venerable old twice-born’ (jarad-dvijanma-mahanubhavah).
Considerably long extracts from Udbhata’s commentary are quoted as the
exponent’s view (purvapaksa) by Cakradhara and Vadidevasuri.
From Kamalasila we know that
there were at least two commentaries (if not more) on the Carvaka-sutras in or before the eighth century. The commentators
explained one sutra (1. 4: tebhayas caitanyam) in two different
ways. Cakradhara mentions Bhavivikta as one among many of the traditional Carvakas.
So the number of commentators may have been more than five that we have been
able to ascertain.
there were at least two commentaries (if not more) on the Carvaka-sutras in or before the eighth century. The commentators
explained one sutra (1. 4: tebhayas caitanyam) in two different
ways. Cakradhara mentions Bhavivikta as one among many of the traditional Carvakas.
So the number of commentators may have been more than five that we have been
able to ascertain.
The names of Aviddhakarna and Bhavivikta
are also found in the Nyaya literature. But at the present state of our
knowledge we cannot say, as Eli Franco writes, whether they were “Carvakas who
converted to Nyaya or Naiyayikas who converted to the Lokayata.” 9 Franco
is also of the opinion that “the possibility of their having introduced Vaisesika
categories into the Carvaka
School is certainly not
unimaginable.”
are also found in the Nyaya literature. But at the present state of our
knowledge we cannot say, as Eli Franco writes, whether they were “Carvakas who
converted to Nyaya or Naiyayikas who converted to the Lokayata.” 9 Franco
is also of the opinion that “the possibility of their having introduced Vaisesika
categories into the Carvaka
School is certainly not
unimaginable.”
Of all the commentators, Udbhata
deserves more notice than others. While the other commentators seem to have
followed the literal meaning of the aphorisms (so far as can be gathered from
the available fragments, admittedly inadequate to form any definite opinion),
Udbhata was indeed a ‘revisionist’ among the materialists. Let me quote a few
of his remarks as reproduced by Vadidevasri:
deserves more notice than others. While the other commentators seem to have
followed the literal meaning of the aphorisms (so far as can be gathered from
the available fragments, admittedly inadequate to form any definite opinion),
Udbhata was indeed a ‘revisionist’ among the materialists. Let me quote a few
of his remarks as reproduced by Vadidevasri:
While explicating the two
aphorisms in the Lokayatasutras, “We
shall now explain the principle” and “Earth, water, fire and air (are the
principles)” [see aphorisms 1.1 and 2], he (sc. Udbhata) described it in
another way, forsaking the conventional interpretation. In the first aphorism,
the term, tattva, tells the
impossibility of laying down any fixed number and essential characteristics of
the sources of knowledge and objects of knowledge. The second aphorism, too, is
explained by him as referring to the objects of knowledge. The word, iti in (the aphorism), “The earth,
water, fire and air iti”, indicates
also the possibility of similar objects of knowledge other than the earth, etc.
Such is his view.
The word, iti does not denote the end, (but) it is illustrative. There are
other principles such as consciousness, sound, pleasure, pain, desire,
aversion, efforts, impression and others. There are also prior nonexistence of
the earth, etc., posterior nonexistence, and mutual difference which are quite
apparent and distinct (from the principles, viz., earth, etc.).
This goes against the very grain
of the Carvaka approach. Like Aviddhakarna, Udbhata too was an accomplished
logician. He could and did use the technical terms of Nyaya to justify the
orthodox Carvaka position. However, he succeeded more in obfuscating than
expounding the significance of the aphorisms. Here is an example (the least
opaque of the fragments related to logic):
of the Carvaka approach. Like Aviddhakarna, Udbhata too was an accomplished
logician. He could and did use the technical terms of Nyaya to justify the
orthodox Carvaka position. However, he succeeded more in obfuscating than
expounding the significance of the aphorisms. Here is an example (the least
opaque of the fragments related to logic):
The one who framed the definition
[see 3.2 above] aimed at brevity of expression, but not only because of this
does inference become secondary. And if they were to define the characteristics
of probans [sadhya, i.e., inferable
property, such as ‘fire’ as attributes of the thing which is a part of the
probandum [hetu, reason, such as
‘smoke’], there would be no secondary significance even in the definition.
It is probable that Jayantabhatta
had Udbhata in mind when he said, “The Carvakas, the well-earned ones, say that
it is really impossible to specifically state the number of the instruments of
cognition.” Given Udbhata’s refusal to delimit the number of the objects of
cognition, it is only one step further to deny any definite number of the
instruments of cognition.
had Udbhata in mind when he said, “The Carvakas, the well-earned ones, say that
it is really impossible to specifically state the number of the instruments of
cognition.” Given Udbhata’s refusal to delimit the number of the objects of
cognition, it is only one step further to deny any definite number of the
instruments of cognition.
In fact, in one instance, Udbhata
seems to verge on pure idealism. He says, “[T]here is an unseen property of the
elements, the particular nature of the elements that constitute the body, which
brings about the experience of diverse pleasures and pains.”
seems to verge on pure idealism. He says, “[T]here is an unseen property of the
elements, the particular nature of the elements that constitute the body, which
brings about the experience of diverse pleasures and pains.”
(c) Verses Attributed to the
Carvakas
Carvakas
Now we come to the last of our
sources, viz., verses attributed to the Carvakas. The epigrams given below are
mostly satirical in intent, affirming at the same time the fundamental
materialist position vis-à-vis religious rites (specially the postmortem ones),
and belief in the existence of the incorporeal soul. Although the Carvaka
philosophers were presumably Brahmins, they had no hesitation in debunking the
priests and their preoccupation with the Vedas. Some of the epigrams run as
follows:
sources, viz., verses attributed to the Carvakas. The epigrams given below are
mostly satirical in intent, affirming at the same time the fundamental
materialist position vis-à-vis religious rites (specially the postmortem ones),
and belief in the existence of the incorporeal soul. Although the Carvaka
philosophers were presumably Brahmins, they had no hesitation in debunking the
priests and their preoccupation with the Vedas. Some of the epigrams run as
follows:
1. There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in
another world.Nor do the
actions of the four castes, orders, etc., produce any real effect.
2. Brhaspati says—The agnihotra,
the three Vedas, the ascetic’s three staves,and smearing
one’s self with ashes—
All these are the livelihood of those destitute of
knowledge and manliness.
3. If a beast slain in the Jyoti¹ºoma
rite will itself go to heaven, Why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer
his own father?
4. If sraddha (offering of rice balls to a dead person) produces gratification to
beings who are dead,Then oil may
rear the flame of an extinguished light of a lamp.
5. If sraddha produces gratification to beings who are dead,Then here, too,
in the case of the travellers when they start, it is needless to give
provisions for the journey.
6. If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the sraddha
here,Then why not
give the food down below to those who are standing on the housetop?
7. While life remains let a man live happily; nothing is beyond
death.
When once the
body becomes ashes, how can it ever return again?
8. If he who departs from the body
goes to another world, How is it that he comes not back again, restless for
love of his kindred?
Hence it is only
as a means of livelihood that Brahmans have established here.
9. All these ceremonies for the dead—there is no other fruit
anywhere.
10. The three authors of the Vedas were
buffoons, knaves, and demons.
All the well-known
formulae of the pandits, jarphari,
turphari etc.
11. And all the rites for the queen
(e.g., holding the penis of the horse) commanded in the Asvamedha (the Horse
sacrifice)—These were
invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds of presents to the priests,While the eating
of flesh was similarly commanded by night prowling demons.
12. O, the naked one (Jain), ascetic
(Buddhist), dimwit, given to practising physical hardship! Who has taught you
this way of leading life?
13. Man consists of only as much as is
within the scope of the senses. What the vastly learned ones speak of (as true)
is but similar to (the statement) ‘O, Dear! Look at the footprint of the wolf!’
14. O, the one with beautiful eyes!
Drink and eat (as you like). O, the one with a charming body! That which is
past does not belong to you. O, the timid one! The past never comes back. This
body is nothing but a collectivity (of the elements).
15. Penances are only various forms of
torments, and abstinence is only depriving oneself of consuming (pleasures of
life). The rituals of agnihotra, etc., appear only to be child’s play.
Some of these verses call for
elucidation but it would require considerable space to do so.10 Here
are a few more verses of a scholarly nature:
elucidation but it would require considerable space to do so.10 Here
are a few more verses of a scholarly nature:
16. No concomitance being possible in
the case of the particular and there being the charge of ‘proving the proved’
in the case of the universal, the subject cannot be justified as a locus of the
probandum. How can, therefore, one talk about inference (as a source of valid
knowledge)?
17. It is easily possible to find, in
all cases, that one’s inference is contradicted either by probans ‘which
nullifies one’s own thesis’, or by a probans ‘which is an invariable opposite’.
18. Indeed, who will deny the validity
of inference when one infers fire from smoke, and so on; for even ordinary
people ascertain the probandum by such inferences, though they may not be
pestered by the logicians.
19. However, inferences that seek to
prove a self, God, an omniscient being, the otherworld, and so on, are not considered
valid by those who know the real nature of things.
20. Simpleminded people cannot derive
the knowledge of probandum by such inferences, so long as their mind is not
vitiated by cunning logicians.
The issue is logic, more
particularly the problem of inference as a valid means of arriving at a
universally valid conclusion. The dig at ‘cunning logicians’ is worth noting.
Unlike other schools, the Carvaka did not aim at ascertaining any truth that
would be valid for all times, past, present and future. They were satisfied
with what was apparent from perception, e.g., the invariable relation between fire,
the antecedent, and smoke, the consequent. Such an inference was acceptable to
them, for it was based on perception. But when the domain of inference was
extended to extrasensory areas (e.g., the existence of God, or of an
omniscient being), they would firmly reject it.
particularly the problem of inference as a valid means of arriving at a
universally valid conclusion. The dig at ‘cunning logicians’ is worth noting.
Unlike other schools, the Carvaka did not aim at ascertaining any truth that
would be valid for all times, past, present and future. They were satisfied
with what was apparent from perception, e.g., the invariable relation between fire,
the antecedent, and smoke, the consequent. Such an inference was acceptable to
them, for it was based on perception. But when the domain of inference was
extended to extrasensory areas (e.g., the existence of God, or of an
omniscient being), they would firmly reject it.
Notes and References
- Stack, George. 1998.
‘Materialism’ in Edwin Craig ed. Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy. London: Routledge. Vol.
6, p. 170. - Campbell, Keith. 1972. ‘Materialism’ in Paul Edwards ed. The
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co. Vol. 5, p. 179. - Campbell, p. 179.
- Trans. Basham, A. L. 1954.
Reprinted in Mircea Eliade. 1979. From Primitive to Zen. London: Collins. p. 110. - Ten Suttas from Digha Nikaya.
1987. Sarnath, Varanasi:
Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies. p. 83. - For details of the sources,
etc. see Bhattacharya, Ramkrishna. 2002. ‘Carvaka
Fragments: A New Collection’. Journal of Indian Philosophy (Dordrecht), 30 (6): 597640. All the
fragments and verses that follow will be found here. Earlier, Dakshinaranjan
Shastri and Mamoru Namai attempted to collect the fragments that were available
to them. - Jayantabhatta brought this charge against the Carvakas in Nyayamañjari.
1982 Gaurinatha Sastri ed. Varanasi:
Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya. Ahnika 4. Part I. p. 388. - For the details of the sources, see my article mentioned
above (n. 6). - Franco, Eli. 1997. Dharmakirti on Compassion and Rebirth.
Wien (Vienna):
Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien. p. 142. - Interested readers may consult my articles and notes published
in 1999. Indian Skeptic, 11 (12); 12 (1); 2002. Jain Journal, 36 (3); 1996.
Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, 14 (1); 1999. 17 (2). For
the details of textual variants, translations, etc. see my article 2002. (n.
6).
We upload this essay “Lokayata
Darsana and a Comparative Study with Greek Materialism” in two parts.
The second
part examines some common misrepresentations about Carvaka/Lokayata
Philosophy. This essay was originally published in Partha Ghose
(ed.), Materialism and Immaterialism in India and the West: Varying Vistas. New Delhi: Centre for
the Studies on Civilizations, 12:5, 2010, pp.21-34,
Darsana and a Comparative Study with Greek Materialism” in two parts.
The second
part examines some common misrepresentations about Carvaka/Lokayata
Philosophy. This essay was originally published in Partha Ghose
(ed.), Materialism and Immaterialism in India and the West: Varying Vistas. New Delhi: Centre for
the Studies on Civilizations, 12:5, 2010, pp.21-34,
To download the essay in pdf format, please Click Here
Prof
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya taught English at the University of Calcutta,
Kolkata and was an Emeritus Fellow of University Grants Commission. He is
now a Fellow of Pavlov Institute, Kolkata.
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya taught English at the University of Calcutta,
Kolkata and was an Emeritus Fellow of University Grants Commission. He is
now a Fellow of Pavlov Institute, Kolkata.
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