The Cārvāka/Lokāyata holds a distinct place in the history of Indian philosophy. Contending against both pro-Vedic Brahminical schools and non-Vedic traditions such as Buddhism and Jainism, the Cārvāka rejected beliefs in an afterlife and the supernatural, advocating an uncompromising materialist philosophy in ancient India. Because most primary material relating to the Cārvāka has been lost, reconstructing its fundamental principles has traditionally relied on the few extant references and quotations preserved in the works of its philosophical opponents. The most recent systematic study of Cārvāka philosophy has been undertaken by Ramkrishna Bhattacharya.

Working on various aspects of Cārvāka thought since 1995, Bhattacharya has succeeded in advancing beyond the findings of earlier scholars. He has not only disproved widespread misconceptions about the Cārvāka but has also refuted several assumptions made by earlier commentators. Furthermore, Bhattacharya sheds light on entirely new areas of inquiry.

The book is a collection of twenty-three self-contained essays examining different dimensions of Cārvāka philosophy. Bhattacharya traces the history of pre-Cārvāka materialist thought in India (in Chapters II and III) by examining Ajita Kesakambala—a senior contemporary of the Buddha and Mahāvīra—alongside other Buddhist, Jain, and Brahminical sources. In Chapter V, he discusses in detail five commentators on the Cārvākasūtra who flourished before the eighth century CE: Aviddhakarṇa, Bhāvivikta, Kambalāśvatara, Purandara, and Udbhaṭa Bhaṭṭa. Moreover, in Chapter VI, Bhattacharya discards several textual fragments previously attributed to the Cārvāka by earlier scholars while identifying new aphorisms, verses, and fragmentary evidence.

A long-standing assumption regarding the Cārvākas was that they recognized sensory perception as the sole means of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). Erich Frauwallner suggested that later materialists, such as Purandara, deviated from this orthodox stance. Bhattacharya challenges Frauwallner’s view in Chapter IV, demonstrating that Purandara’s acceptance of “inference as recognized in everyday worldly experience” was not a revisionist departure, but rather an elaboration of the core Cārvāka view on epistemology. In fact, the Cārvākas did not dispute the practical, limited validity of inference in everyday life. What they rejected were metaphysical inferences that exceeded empirical experience to assert the existence of an immortal soul, post-mortem transmigration, God, heaven, hell, or an omniscient supreme being.

Regarding two prevalent misconceptions—that the Cārvākas promoted sensual indulgence as the ultimate goal of life (summum bonum) and that physical pleasure was their sole objective—Bhattacharya shows these to be misrepresentations fabricated by opponents to render the philosophy morally objectionable. Such polemical tactics have historically been directed against materialist thinkers in both Eastern and Western traditions, including Epicurus. While the Cārvākas maintained that no transcendent pleasure exists beyond this world, this stance does not equate to unbridled hedonism. In Chapter XIX, Bhattacharya demonstrates how specific verses were distorted and subsequently misattributed to the Cārvākas. In addition to re-evaluating these verses, he examines previously underutilized sources—such as Perso-Arabic accounts in Chapter XXII—to analyze historical references to the Cārvāka tradition.

Bhattacharya’s work represents a major contribution to the study of ancient India’s materialist and rationalist heritage.